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Abstract 
 
Recent work has emphasized the importance of regional strategies downstream, adding new 
depth to the debate on ‘globalization’. This paper adds to the debate by exploring the regional 
dimension upstream for a sample of Triad-based Fortune 500 firms. We find support for our 
hypothesis that MNEs with higher levels of value-added upstream are relatively constrained 
in their ability to shift that activity outside the home region due to its strategic significance to 
home-region stakeholders.  
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Introduction 
In recent work, Rugman and Verbeke (2004, 2005) show that regionally oriented strategies 
predominate among the world’s largest MNEs and thus that the regional component of MNE 
strategy and structure deserves more attention. In seeking explanations for strategies that defy 
the apparent ‘logic’ of global strategies, they suggest that the factors that shape location 
choices and geographic diversification strategies must have a regional character (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2005).  
Such factors have essentially been introduced as location advantages that exist at the 
regional level and emerge when firms can more easily exploit their own advantages 
throughout the region as a consequence of similar culture and tastes, or low geographic, 
economic, administrative and institutional distance (Ghemawat, 2001). As a result, gains can 
be captured when linking investments can be made at the regional level to meld existing firm-
specific competitive advantages and foreign-location advantages. Together these factors pose 
a wealth of barriers to entry for ‘regional outsider’ firms, and, conversely, their absence 
within regions pose advantages for ‘regional insider’ firms.  
In addition, Rugman and Verbeke (2004) argue that such barriers for regional outsider 
firms are greater for activities at the ‘customer end’ (branding, marketing and retail) than 
activities at the ‘back end’ (sourcing and production) for two reasons. First, they argue that 
firm advantages related to upstream activities are less ‘location-bound’ than firm advantages 
related to downstream activities. Second, the costs incurred to develop firm-specific 
advantages at the customer-end are ‘one-sided’, meaning that the firm makes such 
investments without any certainty of commitment from the customer, while such investments 
at the back-end are relatively ‘many-sided’ (i.e., spread out over multiple actors such as 
suppliers, contractors or venture partners). Both arguments suggest that upstream activities 
should be more geographically dispersed than downstream activities. In more recent work, 
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however, Rugman and Verbeke (2005) suggest that some evidence does exist for the 
importance of home-region production networks on the upstream side. This picture will only 
become clearer if the analysis is ‘unbundled into upstream and downstream components’ 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2004: 14).  
Critically evaluating the ‘region-boundedness’ of upstream activities centers on 
understanding the importance of those activities to home-region stakeholders. We argue that 
the ‘many-sidedness’ of upstream investments in the home region constrains MNEs in their 
ability to relocate those activities outside the home region, particularly where those activities 
involve high levels of value added. While knowledge-intensive activities and vertically 
integrated production are increasingly faced with the potential for greater global mobility, 
they remain vitally important to home-region stakeholders such as governments, suppliers 
labor and research institutes. In such cases, relocation decisions are seen as a threat to the 
‘many-sided’ investments shared by those stakeholders. This type of ‘stickiness’ (cf. 
Markusen, 1999) is rooted in the MNE’s accountability to home-region stakeholders (Kolk, 
2005) and is largely the result of co-evolutionary processes, particularly through regional 
integration (Volberda and Lewin, 2003; Rugman, 2005). 
We explore the issue of stickiness by considering the knowledge intensity of upstream 
activities and the MNE’s ability to substitute those activities across regions based on the 
potential for cross-border vertical integration. With respect to knowledge intensity, Benito et 
al. (2003) argue that in particular higher value-added activities such as R&D are stickier than 
lower value-added activities as a result of the ‘linkages with suppliers, customers and 
domestic institutions’ (p. 445), which have likely taken many years to evolve. With respect to 
the potential for cross-border integration, we argue that a firm’s ability to arbitrage across 
regions is determined in large part by its ability to conduct vertical FDI, particularly in 
response to labor cost differentials (Ghemawat, 2003). As such ‘stickiness’, and the 
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unbundling of the region-boundedness of upstream versus downstream activities, depends on 
the motives for and nature of extra-regional activity. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the regional dimension of strategy 
and structure as addressed by the international business and strategy literature, focusing on 
the co-evolutionary processes at the regional level. We then formulate hypotheses on the 
relationship between knowledge intensity, vertical integration and the ‘region-boundedness’ 
of upstream activities relative to downstream activities. These hypotheses also have 
implications for the intra-versus extra-regional dimensions of firm structure, which leads to 
additional hypotheses on the way in which MNEs organize their subsidiary networks both 
inside and outside their home region. These hypotheses are tested for a sample of 155 Fortune 
Global 500 firms using data on the geographic spread of sales and production, as well as data 
on the location of each firm’s subsidiaries and each subsidiary’s place in the corporate 
hierarchy.  
 
Theory development and hypotheses 
 
The regional dimension of strategy and structure 
Recent explanations for the cause of a predominant home-region orientation under the 
world’s largest MNEs have thus far centered on extra-regional entry barriers, a lack of 
capabilities at the firm level, or even the possibility of economic optimality being obtained at 
the home regional level and not the global level. Host-region barriers to entry are rooted in 
the relatively greater geographic, economic, administrative, institutional and cultural distance 
(Ghemawat, 2001; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) between Triad regions than within Triad 
regions, or an MNE’s inabilities to exploit firm-specific advantages (FSAs) across multiple 
regions (Rugman and Verbeke, 2005). Similarly, if firms do not possess the strategic 
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advantages required to exploit their firm specific advantages in a host region, strategies aimed 
at the home region can be economically more viable than ‘global’ strategies (Rugman, 2005; 
Schlie and Yip, 2000). 
A broad range of literature addresses the regional dimension of strategy and structure 
both implicitly and explicitly. Differences across Triad regions underpin many studies of 
strategy (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) and internationalization 
(Ohmae, 1985; Rugman, 2000; Geringer et al., 1989). Organizational characteristics such as 
coordination and control are often compared at the Triad level (Hodgetts and Greenwood, 
2001; Yeh and Sagafi-nejad, 1987). It has also been noted that firms tend to look for capital 
primarily within their home regions (Rugman and Verbeke, 2005), and that firm directorates 
have been shown to ‘interlock’ within the home region (Ruigrok et al., 1999). The literature 
on regional-level convergence in ‘business systems’ (Whitley, 1999) and Triad-level 
differences in ‘industrial complexes’ (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995) highlight regional 
differences in the configurations of stakeholders within which firms are embedded.  
More recently, it has been suggested that the role of ‘co-evolution’ in shaping firm 
strategies has taken on an increasingly regional character, particularly as a result of regional 
integration initiatives in the early 1990s (Rugman, 2005; Benito et al., 2003). The theory of 
co-evolution argues that firms face structural inertia when confronted with challenges of 
strategic renewal (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). As strategy evolves over time and in 
conjunction with multiple stakeholders such as governments, labor, suppliers, customers, and 
financiers, the strategies of the MNE and such stakeholders become interwoven and thus 
interdependent, which reduces the firm’s strategic latitude.  
Originally, these relationships form the foundations of an MNE’s competitive 
advantage. Yet over time, MNEs and the stakeholders around them become increasingly 
locked into this web. The more companies are ‘coupled to a prevailing organizational 
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template’, the less likely they are to seek change (Flier et al., 2003: 2166). The web of 
relationships in which firm strategies evolve can thus be seen as a source of structural inertia 
that constrains firms in their room to maneuver geographically and represent forces that are 
distinct both from purely economic incentives to stay, as well as extra-regional barriers to 
entry. This inertia can be understood as a form of ‘stickiness’ that prevents hyper-mobility in 
an increasingly ‘slippery production space’ (Markusen, 1999).  
 
The ‘stickiness’ of production space and technology space 
Production space is considered increasingly ‘slippery’ under the assumption that the motive 
to internationalize is a given (cf. Tallman and Yip, 2001) and that MNE production strategies, 
and thus strategies for adding value, are relatively homogenous. Yet MNEs internationalize 
due to various reasons: access to new markets, access to natural resources, potential 
efficiency gains through e.g. cheap labor or proximity to strategic assets such as knowledge 
(Dunning, 1993). As more and more countries link in to the global economy and try to attract 
FDI through cost advantages (UNCTAD, 1998), in particular efficiency-seeking investments 
are increasingly faced with a potentially slippery space.  
The increasing availability of knowledge and higher skill levels in a larger number of 
host countries is also linked to the rapid growth of strategic asset seeking FDI exemplified by 
the growing dispersion of R&D (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003). Therefore, not only 
production space, but also technology space is increasingly slippery as know-how is more 
readily available in host locations, leading to enhanced possibilities for tapping into new 
knowledge, improving local responsiveness, developing an international division of labor 
with respect to R&D and costs-sharing across multiple locations (Contractor et al., 2003; 
Cheng and Bolon, 1993). The traditional view, on the other hand, has held that R&D 
activities remain centralized due to their potential for economies of scale (Rugman, 1981). 
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More recently, Benito et al. (2003) argue that in particular higher value-added activities (such 
as R&D) are ‘stickier’ than lower value-added activities due to the ‘linkages with suppliers, 
customers and domestic institutions’ (p. 445), which have likely taken many years to evolve. 
From this it follows that the ‘many-sidedness’ of investments discussed by Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004) is perhaps not so much a strictly ‘upstream’ phenomenon, but rather a 
reflection of the strategic significance of particular value-adding activities for not only the 
MNE, but also for the stakeholders in its co-evolutionary web.  
That strategic significance of adding value can be linked to a firm’s motives for inter-
regional FDI, and whether that FDI substitutes for or complements existing home-region 
activity (cf. Slaughter, 2003). For example, efficiency seeking and strategic-asset seeking can 
be linked to substitutive investment strategies, by which value added activities are shifted 
through geographic space (e.g. shifting production or R&D in the home region to a low-cost 
site offshore). Market seeking and natural resource seeking strategies, on the other hand, can 
be linked to complementary investment strategies where value-adding activities are expanded 
through geographic space. This is because investment is more likely to be ‘horizontal’, by 
which the firm’s activities in the host location are essentially a replication, and thus 
expansion, of existing activities (Slaughter, 2003; Markusen and Maskus, 2001; Caves, 
1996).  
A shift of production abroad in response to low-cost labor or the ability to offshore 
knowledge-intensive R&D jeopardizes the many-sided investments made by the home-region 
stakeholders to whom the rents of that production accrue. Labor, suppliers, cluster partners 
and governments are all affected by the ‘leak’ of jobs, tenders, tax revenue and technology 
outside the region (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). Expanding production abroad (to service 
local markets or to tap into location-bound resources such as oil) tends to complement, and 
not substitute for, existing activities. Complementary investment strategies may in fact 
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increase the value of existing home-region investments by spreading fixed costs (Contractor 
et al., 2003) and increasing returns to capital (Slaughter, 2003), and thus be encouraged by 
home-region stakeholders. 
To illustrate, if an MNE in e.g. the computer industry closes down chip plant C in 
California and shifts production to China, plant C is unlikely to be replaced with another and 
the redundant workers in Palo Alto may not shift seamlessly into new employment. The 
computer manufacturer’s decision, regardless of its efficiency-based logic, still poses a 
problem for employees, governments, local communities, suppliers and other location-bound 
stakeholders affected by spillovers. In e.g. retail, on the other hand, internationalization is 
related to investment motives that do not necessarily compromise the interests of home-
region stakeholders or affect home-region supply and demand relationships (Slaughter, 
2003). Market seeking and natural resource seeking investments are less likely to substitute 
for commitments at home, and are at the same time more likely to be ‘one-sided’ investments 
made by the MNE alone (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004).  
 
Stickiness and the unrealized potential for geographic dispersion upstream  
The multi-stakeholder investments associated with higher value-added activities, which 
reflect the human, physical and financial capital embedded in those activities, are implicitly 
devalued when existing higher value-added activities in the home region are substituted with 
activities outside the region. Conversely, such stickiness may be tempered in cases where 
extra-regional investment is perceived as complementary to existing investments. 
Paradoxically, therefore, it seems that precisely those industries in which upstream activities 
theoretically have the most to gain from ‘slipperiness’ are subjected to the highest levels of 
home-region stickiness, and thus most constrained in their ability to arbitrage effectively by 
substituting activities between regions.  
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Benito et al. (2003) point out in this regard that managers, in addition to being 
boundedly rational, are cognizant of the substantial costs involved in relocation. In their 
reluctance to pursue radical change, firms may maintain a theoretically sub-optimal status 
quo. At a higher level of aggregation, that sub-optimal status quo at the firm level translates 
into the state of ‘semi-globalization’ observed by Ghemawat (2003). The proposed stickiness 
of knowledge-intensive and vertically-integrated activities upstream1 leads to the following 
hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 1a: Upstream activities in knowledge-intensive MNEs are 
more region-bound than the upstream activities of MNEs 
characterized by lower levels of knowledge intensity. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Upstream activities in highly vertically integrated 
MNEs are more region-bound than the upstream activities of MNEs 
characterized by lower levels of vertical integration. 
 
Upstream stickiness can be seen as a form of ‘unrealized potential’ for geographic 
dispersion in relation to the existing higher geographic dispersion of downstream activities. 
As firms expand the geographic scope of their activities (either upstream or downstream), 
they gain international experience, develop new managerial capabilities, and tap into 
networks of local stakeholders. The greater that dispersion, the greater the firm’s 
opportunities to capitalize on that dispersion and enhance performance (Goerzen and 
Beamish, 2003). This successful deployment of firm-specific advantages means that firms are 
able to make the linking investments needed to meld firm advantages and location advantages 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2005). A greater geographic dispersion of downstream activities 
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should help lay the groundwork for a greater geographic dispersion of upstream activities, 
and thus the former provides a ‘benchmark’ against which the latter can be measured.2  
This supposition could be countered by the argument that upstream location 
advantages are more location-bound than downstream location advantages (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2004). Yet if firms from each Triad region are able to build coherent and successful 
upstream networks in their own respective regions, this suggests that upstream location 
advantages are present in all regions and could therefore theoretically be tapped into by firms 
from other regions as well. From the stickiness perspective, this extra-regional potential is 
underutilized not because the location advantages are not present or because firms do not 
possess the firm-level advantages necessary to develop those upstream activities outside the 
home region. It remains underutilized because firms are locked in to upstream networks at 
home (or, conversely, are ‘locked out’ of those extra-regional networks for the same reasons). 
Over time, firms can develop such advantages in the form of managerial capabilities 
and the ability to make the linking investments required to tap into extra-regional upstream 
networks. As these advantages are developed, firms will be more successful in shifting higher 
value-adding activities outside the home region. The more this occurs, the less dependent 
firms become on their home region and, consequently, the less locked in they will be to the 
interests of home-region stakeholders. We argued above that for firms in non-sticky 
industries, the dispersion of upstream activities can more closely mirror the dispersion of 
downstream activities because the extra-regional deployment of such activities is not seen as 
a threat to existing home-region activities. Here we argue that the same is likely to hold for 
MNEs in sticky industries which have already proven successful at developing upstream 
activities outside the home region. From this we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: The gap between the home-region boundedness of 
upstream and downstream activities of firms in knowledge intensive 
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industries is smaller when upstream activities are more extra-
regional. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The gap between the home-region boundedness of 
upstream and downstream activities of firms in vertically integrated 
industries is smaller when upstream activities are more extra-
regional. 
 
Stickiness and MNE structure 
Even though higher levels of extra-regionality can reduce the constraints formed by home-
region stakeholders, knowledge intensity and vertical integration will, ceteris paribus, always 
be associated with a greater gap between extra-regionalization upstream and extra-
regionalization downstream.  If upstream activities are in all cases relatively region-bound for 
knowledge intensive and vertically integrated MNEs, this must have implications for MNE 
structure. Rugman and Verbeke (2004) argue that setting up upstream activities in host 
locations is facilitated by the investments of local stakeholders such as governments and 
suppliers (i.e., ‘many-sidedness’). We propose that this many-sidedness should be reflected in 
higher host-location embeddedness. This means that firms that are constrained in the 
relocation of higher value-adding activities outside the home region will necessarily be less 
embedded in host locations outside the home region.  
Bruinsma et al. (1998) have argued in this same vein that relocation-based (i.e., 
substitutive) internationalization strategies are linked to lower host-country embeddedness 
levels. Similarly, local responsiveness pressures (Prahalad and Doz, 1987) are best reflected 
in horizontal FDI patterns, by which both upstream and downstream activities are situated in 
the host location in order to link production to local needs. From the local responsiveness 
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argument follows that embeddedness should be higher for ‘multidomestic’ (i.e., 
‘multinational’) strategies, where competitive advantage rests on exploiting the downstream, 
than for ‘global’ strategies based on segmented, rationalized and integrated 
internationalization of upstream activities (Harzing, 2000; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1992).  
Harzing (2002) tied knowledge intensity, vertical integration and embeddedness 
together in research on international entry modes. She demonstrated that ‘global’ (i.e. 
integrated / vertical) MNEs are more likely to enter host markets through greenfield 
investments, while ‘multidomestic’ (i.e. locally responsive / horizontal) MNEs are more 
likely to acquire existing firms. When existing firms are acquired, they are generally afforded 
higher autonomy levels, which can be seen as part of the local responsiveness strategy of 
‘multidomestic’ MNEs. An existing firm is more likely to have long-established ties to its 
local economy, and thus be considered more locally embedded, than a subsidiary established 
through greenfield investment. Harzing (2002) further showed that R&D intensity was related 
to a preference for greenfield investments over acquisition of existing local firms, from which 
follows that both knowledge intensity and vertical integration are negatively related to local 
embeddedness, despite evidence that MNE affiliates are now more deeply embedded in host 
country innovation systems (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003). As a result, we hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 3a: Knowledge-intensive MNEs will exhibit lower levels of 
host-region embeddedness than less knowledge intensive MNEs. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Highly vertically-integrated MNEs will exhibit lower 
levels of host-region embeddedness than less vertically-integrated 
MNEs.  
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Methodology 
Data and design 
To test the hypotheses developed above, we collected data (for the year 2001/2002) on the 
geographic dispersion of sales, assets as well as all the majority-controlled subsidiaries for 
147 manufacturing firms. The sample represents all Triad-based firms from the top 200 of the 
Fortune Global 500, excluding financial service firms and firms with no identifiable extra-
regional assets, sales or subsidiaries. Given the home-region emphasis of the study, the 
decision to analyze only Triad firms was taken to reduce potential ‘noise’ from a relatively 
small group of non-Triad firms spread across different home regions. The firms in the final 
sample were evenly spread across the triad, with 43 based in North America, 56 in Europe 
and 48 from Asia. Together these 147 firms controlled 36,776 subsidiaries worldwide 
(majority owned) and accounted for over $6 trillion in assets and sales.  
The analysis is built up in two steps. In the first step we use a limited OLS regression 
model (N=124) to explore the relationship between knowledge intensity, vertical integration 
and the relative region-boundedness of upstream versus downstream activities (Hypotheses 
1a and 1b, and 2a and 2b). The reduced N in the first stage is the result of log-transforming 
the RND variable (see below), by which all cases with a ‘0’ value in the original RND 
variable returned as undefined after transformation. Using the predicted values generated by 
the first regression, we estimate an additional regression model to explore the relationship 
between our ‘stickiness’ proxy and host-region embeddedness levels (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). 
Since the results of the first step show that stickiness has an explicit sector-specific character, 
we also cluster firms by sector to distinguish between industries subject to high stickiness 
levels and those subject to low stickiness levels. A regression using a sector-specific, 
dichotomous stickiness variable (‘high’ or ‘low’) is also used in the second step as a dummy 
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variable to explore the relationship between stickiness and embeddedness for the full sample 
(N=147).  
 
Variables and methods 
The measures are based on the geographic decomposition of assets and sales, drawn from 
company annual reports, and subsidiary data drawn from the Dun & Bradstreet ‘Who Owns 
Whom’ Database for the year 2002. All three are commonly used to develop indicators of 
internationalization at the firm level (Sullivan, 1994; Goerzen and Beamish, 2003; Ruigrok 
and Wagner, 2003; Delios and Beamish, 2005). Since geographic segmentation differs across 
firms, the segmentation of assets and sales data as reported in the annual report was 
reconfigured to reflect a division between sales and assets in the home region and those 
outside the home region. This reconfiguration was used to measure extra-regionality of 
upstream and downstream activities. 
Upstream activities are proxied by assets, with extra-regional upstream activities 
(XUP) defined as the percentage of total assets outside the home (geographic) region. The 
location of a firm’s assets forms an indication of the location of a firm’s productive capacity 
(UNCTAD, 1997). Downstream activities are proxied by sales by destination, with extra-
regionality of downstream activities (XDOWN) defined as the percentage of sales outside the 
home (geographic) region. The location of sales by destination is a measure of the location of 
market penetration, or the locus of consumption (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004). The 
difference in extra-regionality upstream and downstream (BOUND), representing the 
stickiness-induced region-boundedness of upstream activities, is calculated as XDOWN 
minus XUP, such that a higher positive value implies that upstream activities are more 
region-bound than downstream activities. BOUND is intended to proxy the ‘unrealized 
potential’ for extra-regionalization upstream. 
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Knowledge intensity (RND) is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales (cf. 
Kotabe et al., 2002). Vertical integration (DVI) at the firm level was measured as the share of 
intra-firm sales in a firm’s total sales (Harzing, 2000; Kobrin, 1991). For R&D expenditure 
we used data from 2002, and for DVI by taking the average intra-firm sales-to-total sales 
ratio for each firm for all years available in the period 1990 to 2002. Since neither R&D 
expenditure nor intra-firm sales are universally reported in annual reports due to cross-
country differences, firm-level discretion and changes over time in accounting regulations 
(Nobes and Parker, 2000), we used sector averages where values were missing. Sectors were 
defined comparable to Kolk (2005); the Fortune Industry codes clustered under each sector 
can be found in the Appendix. As the Appendix shows, there is a high coincidence between 
the number of firms reporting per sector and the average value of those firms per measure.  
The Dun & Bradstreet data in the form of ‘corporate trees’ allows not only for a 
geographic decomposition of the subsidiary base, but also the relationships between 
subsidiaries. Since many subsidiaries are themselves parents to further subsidiaries, each 
layer of parent-subsidiary relationships within the overall corporate tree can be identified. A 
longer chain of parent-subsidiary relationships among subsidiaries (and thus a higher number 
of levels) in a given host country or region is assumed to reflect a higher level of local 
embeddedness (due to a greater within-organization distance from headquarters and a higher 
likelihood of local linkages). Extra-regional embeddedness is therefore measured as the 
average level in the corporate tree of all extra-regional subsidiaries (XEMBED), with high 
values reflecting higher levels of embeddedness.  
We also add a number of controls. We include two size variables based on total sales 
(SIZE_sales) and the total number of subsidiaries (SIZE_#subs). We consider the average 
number of subsidiaries per extra-regional host country (SUBPXHOST) to control for the 
possibility that embeddedness in a given host country is solely a function of the number of 
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subsidiaries in that country (as opposed to a function of the way in which they are organized). 
To capture the extra-regional dimension using firms’ corporate trees, we use the number of 
subsidiaries outside the home region as a percentage of total subsidiaries (XSUB). The share 
of extra-regional to total subsidiaries was preferred over alternate measures such as the 
entropy index used by Delios and Beamish (2005), since the entropy index is weighted for the 
number of subsidiaries per host country. As such it is too much of a composite variable, being 
highly correlated with the total number of subsidiaries, the embeddedness measure and the 
number of subsidiaries per host country. Triad-region dummies were included to account for 
differences by region of origin. No sector dummies were included since the knowledge 
intensity and vertical integration measures capture the relevant sector effects. Where 
variables exhibited non-normality, they were transformed either through log-transformation 
(XEMBED, SIZE_sales, SIZE_#subs) or by taking the square root (XSUB, SUBPXHOST).3 
Descriptives and correlations for the sample are given in Table 1. 
TABLE 1  
 
Results 
In the first step of the analysis, the gap between extra-regionality upstream and downstream 
(BOUND) was regressed on the degree of vertical integration (DVI) and knowledge intensity 
(RND) to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Since the correlation matrix and the Appendix show that 
DVI and RND are themselves correlated, an interaction effect was included to reflect the 
assumption that the highest stickiness levels are found when DVI and RND levels are both 
high. Two home-region dummies were included for Europe and Asia, with North American 
MNEs being the reference category. The extra-regionalization of upstream activities (XUP) 
was included to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b. We mean-centered the interactor variables (DVI 
and RND) before calculating the interaction in order to minimize the risk of multicollinearity 
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(Murray et al., 2005). The regression was performed blockwise in order to best assess the 
contribution of different variables as well as possible multicollinearity problems (Law et al., 
2003). The results are given in Table 2.  
TABLE 2  
 
Table 2 shows that the coefficients remain stable as each block is added and the 
increases in explanatory power are significant at each block. Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIFs) and condition index are low (ranging from 1.2 to 1.7 and below 20, respectively), 
indicating no problems of multicollinearity. The residuals were normally distributed and 
showed no signs of heteroscedasticity. We also ran the model controlling for size using the 
SIZE_sales variable (not shown here), which itself was insignificant and led to identical 
results; moreover, it appeared to share its variance with the intercept, generating condition 
index values well above the acceptable level of 30. Further, the two regional dummies are 
highly non-significant, indicating that the relationship between upstream home-boundedness 
on the one hand, and knowledge intensity and vertical integration on the other, is not region 
specific.  
The main effects of vertical integration and knowledge intensity in particular are 
significant and positively related to the relative home-boundedness of upstream activities. 
The interaction effect further substantiates the main effects, indicating that the upstream 
activities are the most home-region bound in relation to downstream activities for firms that 
are both highly knowledge intensive and vertically integrated. These results support 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Additionally, XUP has the opposite sign as BOUND and was highly 
significant, meaning that the more extra-regional an MNE’s upstream activities become, the 
smaller the extra-regionalization gap between the upstream and the downstream. This 
provides support for Hypothesis 2a and 2b. Although it could be argued that as both XUP and 
 19
XDOWN approach 100 percent, their potential maximum difference in relative terms 
decreases, the descriptives in Table 1 show that mean XUP values are below 25 percent with 
a standard deviation of less than 20 percent, and BOUND averaged at just over three percent, 
leaving considerable room for high home-region boundedness even at the higher end of XUP 
values among firms in the sample. Our explanation is that as firms become more successful in 
shifting upstream activities outside the home region, the constraint formed by home-region 
stickiness declines. 
Not only are knowledge intensity and vertical integration correlated, they are largely a 
reflection of sector characteristics. A plot of sector means (based on ranks) shows that sectors 
associated with efficiency-seeking, potentially substitutive vertical FDI (automotive, 
computers & electronics; chemicals & pharmaceuticals) are the same sectors with high home-
boundedness of upstream activities relative to downstream activities (Figure 1).  Meanwhile, 
sectors such as fast-moving consumer goods, retail, utilities and construction, with low levels 
of R&D and vertical integration, show little to no difference in the extra-regional character of 
their upstream and downstream activities. Not only does this reflect a lack of stickiness per 
se; it also reflects high local responsive pressures (often in combination with the production 
of non-tradeables) that necessitate expansive, horizontal strategies. Petroleum and trading, on 
the other hand, exhibit above average levels of vertical integration but relatively low levels of 
knowledge intensity which, according to the model in Table 2, is the more crucial factor in 
relative upstream home-boundedness. This, in combination with the expansive character of 
natural resource seeking and market seeking investment, leads to below-average stickiness 
and hence below-average BOUND values.  
FIGURE 1  
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The characteristics of ‘sticky’ sectors versus ‘non-sticky’ sectors as indicated in Table 
2 and Figure 1 already suggest support for earlier research that non-sticky (i.e., 
‘multidomestic’) industries, with their relatively low levels of upstream home-region 
boundedness, are more likely to locate a broader spectrum of value-added levels in host 
locations and are therefore more locally embedded (Harzing, 2000; Harzing, 2002; Bruinsma 
et al., 1998). We tested this (Hypotheses 3a and 3b) formally through a series of regression 
models, with extra-regional embeddedness (XEMBED) as the dependent variable (Table 3).  
TABLE 3  
 
Given that high knowledge intensity and vertical integration appear to go hand in 
hand, we no longer distinguished between the two in our investigation of extra-regional 
embeddedness. The first three models in Table 3 were constructed using the stickiness values 
predicted by the model in Table 2 (n=124), where the relative home-region boundedness of 
upstream activities is proxied by a continuous variable. In Model 1 we included all the 
variables, including home region effects, size (the total number of subsidiaries), the extra-
regional share of the total number of subsidiaries and the average number of subsidiaries per 
extra-regional host country as moderators of overall embeddedness levels. Model 1 shows 
that Asian MNEs exhibit significantly lower embeddedness levels than European and North 
American MNEs, and that neither size nor the extra-regional dispersion of the subsidiary base 
are significant with respect to embeddedness. As might be expected, the number of 
subsidiaries per extra-regional host country shows a significant positive relationship with the 
number of levels in the extra-regional subsidiary tree. Even taking that effect into account, 
the predicted stickiness variable is significant and negative relative to extra-regional 
embeddedness, supporting the hypothesis that sticky industries are less embedded outside the 
host region. 
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Models 2 and 3 are reduced versions of Model 1 in order to eliminate any potential 
effects arising from the moderate bivariate correlations between size, the extra-regional 
dispersion of subsidiaries and the number of subsidiaries per extra-regional host country 
shown in Table 1 (even though the VIFs and condition indices were well within acceptable 
bounds). As a result of removing the variable for subsidiaries per extra-regional host country, 
both extra-regional subsidiary share and the size variable become significant, as well as the 
EU dummy, indicating that European MNEs have the highest number of subsidiaries per host 
country, all else being equal. The Asia dummy shows that Asian firms, on the other hand, 
have smaller subsidiary bases and fewer subsidiaries per host country outside the home 
region than both North American and European MNEs. Finally, the home-region 
boundedness of upstream activities is negatively related to extra-regional embeddedness 
levels, even in the case of the full model (model 1), in support of Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
Models 4 through 6 are new estimations using the dummy-coded variable for stickiness based 
on the sector split shown in Figure 1, by which the full sample of 147 firms could be 
analyzed.4 The results are nearly identical to the results in Models 1 through 3, with 
significant model values, high R-squared values and satisfactory diagnostics.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper we have tried to shed new light on the discussion surrounding the apparent 
prevalence of region-based strategies. Earlier work (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004) has shown 
that MNEs are relatively region-bound in their downstream activities due to various forms of 
distance which negatively impact the MNE’s ability to fully exploit its firm-level advantages. 
Others have emphasized the current state of ‘semiglobalization’ (Ghemawat, 2003), by which 
incomplete integration actually facilitates arbitrage strategies, i.e. greater spread of vertically-
integrated production (upstream) across borders, in response to factor price differentials.  
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We have argued that in general, upstream activities are less likely to be extra-regional 
than downstream activities. Our argument centers on the ‘many-sidedness’ of existing 
upstream investments by home-region stakeholders as a source of stickiness that constrains 
the globalization of upstream activities. We contend that such stickiness arises when 
upstream activities are perceived as strategically sensitive by home-region stakeholders (e.g. 
governments, suppliers, financiers and labor). We link this sensitivity to knowledge intensity 
on the one hand, and to the MNE’s ability to relocate production abroad through cross-border 
vertical integration on the other. By relocating knowledge-intensive (high value-adding) 
activities, firms can spread fixed costs. By relocating production, firms can attain higher 
efficiency levels. Yet in both cases the shift of such activities abroad can compromise the 
existing investments in those activities by home-region stakeholders. Additionally, we 
contend that when firms are constrained in their ability to relocate high value-adding 
activities outside their home region, they will necessarily be less embedded in extra-regional 
host locations.  
We used regression models to investigate these relationships on a sample of the 
largest Triad-based MNEs from the Fortune Global 500. Although the data set is relatively 
small, it encompasses the well-known MNEs at the heart of the globalization debate in both 
the academic literature and the media, and is compensated for to some extent by its depth, 
covering in addition to sales and production a combined total of more than 36,000 
subsidiaries spread around the globe. The results showed that lagging ‘globalization’ of 
upstream activities relative to downstream activities was strongly related to both knowledge 
intensity and vertical integration, and that the distinction was largely sector-based. As a result 
the highest levels of relative upstream home-region boundedness were found among firms 
with high levels of both knowledge intensity and vertical integration, namely in Computers & 
Electronics, Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals and the Automotive industries. Conversely, the 
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lowest levels of relative upstream region-boundedness were found among industries 
associated with lower levels of knowledge intensity and vertical integration, such as Retail, 
Fast-Moving Consumer Goods and Utilities. 
The results also show that even in sticky industries, some MNEs succeed in escaping, 
to some degree, the stickiness of their home-region stakeholders. This reduced dependency 
on the home region facilitates the MNE’s ability to relocate upstream activities outside the 
home region, thereby reducing the gap between extra-regionalization upstream and 
downstream. Yet no matter how successful the MNE is in dispersing its upstream activities in 
the face of stickiness, knowledge-intensive and vertically integrated MNEs will necessarily 
be less embedded in host-region locations than MNEs that can increase the dispersion of 
upstream activities more freely in conjunction with the dispersion of downstream activities.  
Our results complement the discussion of host-region factors that induce MNEs to 
remain focused on their home regions. In addition to economic arguments for a regional 
orientation, that orientation emerges in part because MNEs are beholden to the interests of 
home-region stakeholders such as supply chain partners, labor and governments. Such 
stakeholders, which at the national level have traditionally been (and to some extent remain) 
sources of competitive advantage, have themselves co-evolved with MNEs, particularly 
through regional integration over the past two decades. By linking their fates to that of their 
related MNEs and thus MNE strategies, their strategic perspectives co-evolve with that of the 
MNE. It is important to recognize that for the MNE strategist, the home-region web of 
stakeholder relationships may define the ‘conceptual box’ in which the manager formulates 
strategy while at the same time forming the ‘geographic box’ which defines the boundaries of 
a firm’s competitive space, irrespective of the purely economic rationale for a regional 
orientation.  
 24
Firms may be able to develop managerial capabilities to help them step outside the 
box of their co-evolutionary stickiness. As a consequence, it may in fact be that strategists of 
long-established MNEs that develop the managerial capabilities to overcome ‘institutional 
idiosyncrasies’ (Henisz, 2003) between regions are able to derive new sources of competitive 
advantage that amount to arbitrage of such idiosyncrasies. More in-depth research is needed 
to isolate and explore these potential and realized capabilities further. In the same vein, the 
analysis of the home region component may further unravel the internationalization – 
performance debate, since the mixed results may have to do with not only the intra- versus 
extra-regional components of internationalization, but also in relation to stickiness levels. 
Similarly, if some knowledge-intensive, vertically integrated MNEs succeed to some extent 
in escaping the gravitational pull of home-region stakeholders, it may be possible to identify 
some ‘threshold’ before which upstream activities remain relatively constrained, and after 
which the upstream-downstream ‘globalization gap’ begins to close. 
Since we argue that regional integration processes are a key driver behind the regional 
orientation of firms, one might expect the spatial organization of multinational enterprises 
prior to the rise of the ‘new regionalism’ (Mansfield and Milner, 2000) to be less regionally 
oriented, with internationalization strategies over the past 15 years aimed primarily at the 
home region. If the ‘current state’ is the result of co-evolution in response to regional 
integration, this begs the question how internationalization patterns would have looked for 
this same set of firms in 1990; i.e., more or less globalized? A longitudinal exploration would 
also shed more light on how and when MNEs in sticky industries are able to breach the 
stickiness ‘threshold’, since in the current study that ability is only inferred based on our 
analysis of current levels of extra-regional dispersion. 
 It must also be emphasized here that our measure of upstream, as well as our 
conceptualization of upstream as representing the actual productive activities undertaken by 
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the MNE itself, excludes outsourcing. When sourcing is included in upstream activities, it 
may more likely to point towards ‘globalization’. But the question remains in that regard 
whether it is the MNE itself that has become more ‘global’, or if it is in fact the supplier that 
has expanded its geographic reach. Even as a case of increased supplier internationalization, 
the internationalization of outsourcing (cf. Kotabe and Murray, 2004) is worth studying 
because as MNE stakeholders, suppliers influence stickiness over time through their own 
strategies. 
Finally, stickiness has to be operationalized and measured. Here it is only theorized 
and empirically inferred through observed differences in internationalization patterns and 
configurations between two types of firms. The suggestion is that regional integration 
strengthens stickiness at the regional level by raising the stakes of internationalization for all 
stakeholders. Yet regional integration processes differ, with European integration the most 
advanced and Asian integration not yet truly developed. At the same time, the data show that 
Asian MNEs remain the most home-region bound of all, suggesting a negative relationship 
between regional integration and home-region stickiness. A further exploration of stickiness 
and its sources must, therefore, take into consideration differences in home regions.  
In the debate on global and regional strategies at the firm level, it is tempting to 
assume that a regional solution, in the face of the apparently undeniable logic of 
‘globalization’, must therefore be related to some form of economic optimality. In macro-
level debates on the optimality of free trade versus protection and other market distortions, it 
has long been acknowledged that the political reality of vested interests leaves a cognition 
gap between the real world and our notions of an economically ideal (‘globalized’) world. 
Ghemawat (2003) has already pointed out that complete globalization would render the MNE 
superfluous and obsolete. In that sense, putting the brakes on ‘globalization’ may very well 
be in the interest of MNE strategists. As such the predominance of regional strategies may 
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simply be a reflection of the same geopolitical concerns that play out at the macro level, only 
this time at the level of individual firms and their web of relationships.  
 
Notes
                                                 
1 We consider the decision to internationalize R&D to be distinct from the decision to internationalize 
production, much as do Markusen and Maskus (2001) in their ‘Knowledge-Capital Model’ of the MNE. 
2 From incremental perspectives on internationalization such as the Uppsala school and the PLC of Vernon, 
sales should initially be more international than production until production catches up. From the perspective of 
Rugman and Verbeke (2004), however, the geographic dispersion of sales forms a conservative benchmark 
since in their view upstream activities should be even more dispersed than sales. 
3 The natural log transformation, which takes the root of the value of e (roughly 2.7), can overcompensate when 
a variable is only moderately skewed. In such cases a square-root transformation (which is the root at 2) can 
produce a superior normal distribution. 
4 The 23 firms omitted in the first step of the analysis all had R&D values of 0 and correspondingly low levels 
of vertical integration, as a result of which they all fall into the ‘low’ stickiness category.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 Fortune Industry 
Codes
N % reporting 
RND
Mean value 
(to total 
sales)
% reporting 
DVI 
Mean value 
(to total 
sales)
COMP 23 100% 7.7% 83% -19.4%
CHEM 11 100% 7.1% 82% -11.5%
AUTO 24 100% 3.9% 63% -17.9%
FOOD 12 75% 1.4% 33% -5.1%
UTIL 20 55% 1.1% 20% -5.7%
PETR 16 75% 0.8% 63% -10.0%
CONST 8 75% 0.8% 63% -3.8%
TRADE 13 46% 0.4% 92% -13.9%
RETAIL 20 45% 0.0% 20% -2.1%
Total 147 76% 3.5% 56% -13.1%
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TABLE 1: Descriptives and correlations 
Correlations  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Mean StD BOUND XUP XDOWN EU_ 
DUM 
ASIA_ 
DUM 
SUBPX 
HOST 
DVI RND SIZE_ 
SUB 
XSUB XEMBED SIZE_ 
SALES
1 3.2% 11.0% 1     
2 24.7% 18.9% 0.11  1.00                     
3 27.9% 20.8% -0.43 *** 0.85 *** 1.00                   
4 0.38 0.49 0.01  0.32 *** 0.28 *** 1.00                 
5 0.33 0.47 0.00  -0.18 * -0.17 ** -0.55 *** 1.00               
6 1.18 0.66 0.03  0.40 *** 0.35 *** 0.25 *** -0.03  1.00             
7 0.30 0.13 -0.34 *** 0.31 *** 0.46 *** 0.13  0.09  0.19 ** 1.00           
8 -3.95 1.16 -0.53 *** 0.13  0.42 *** -0.05  -0.10  0.03  0.44 *** 1.00         
9 5.13 0.97 -0.02  0.42 *** 0.40 *** 0.47 *** -0.24 *** 0.63 *** 0.32 *** 0.03  1.00       
10 0.51 0.20 -0.15 * 0.47 *** 0.51 *** -0.29 *** -0.02  0.43 *** 0.28 *** 0.34 *** 0.16 * 1.00     
11 0.84 0.38 0.01  0.30 *** 0.27 *** 0.45 *** -0.48 *** 0.54 *** -0.03  -0.02  0.51 *** 0.19 ** 1.00   
12 10.34 0.76 0.04  0.15 * 0.12  0.12  -0.23 *** 0.23 *** 0.10  0.02  0.29 *** 0.06  0.27 *** 1.00
 ***, **; * Correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively (2-tailed). 
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TABLE 2: OLS regression results for BOUND (n=124)      
BOUND    
 Block 1 +Block 2 +Block 3 +Block 4 
(Constant) 0.05 (0.02) ** 0.17 (0.05) *** 0.24 (0.05) *** 0.20 (0.05) *** 
EU_DUM -0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02)
ASIA_DUM 
 
-0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)  0.00 (0.02)
DVI   0.14 (0.08) ** 0.18 0.08) ** 0.18 (0.08) ** 
RND 
 
  0.05 (0.01) *** 0.05 (0.01) *** 0.04 (0.01) *** 
XUP 
 
  -0.14 (0.04) *** -0.15 (0.04) *** 
DVI x RND    0.15 (0.07) ** 
     
Model F  0.146 13.009 *** 13.501 ***  12.534 *** 
Adjusted R2  -0.01 0.28 0.34   0.36
∆ R2  0.30 0.06   0.03
∆ F   25.813 11.068   5.260
Significance of 
change 
 *** ***   **
Coefficients are unstandardized 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***, **, * significant at 0.001, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
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FIGURE 1: Sectors by average R&D and DVI rankings (N=147)   
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The role of stickiness in MNE structure 
 Stickiness as a continuous variable 
(predicted values, n=124) 
Stickiness as a dichotomous variable 
(HI/LO, n=147) 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 
EU_DUM 0.036  0.173 * 0.343 *** 0.082 0.216  0.421 *** 
 (0.376)  (1.691)  (3.410)  (0.901) 2.296  (4.936)
ASIA_DUM -0.481 *** -0.303 *** -0.328 *** -0.393 *** -0.272 *** -0.234 *** 
 (-5.488)  (-3.405)  (-3.455)  (-5.161) -3.502  (-2.868)
SIZE_SUB 0.043  0.335 ***   0.108 0.324 *** 
 (0.473)  (4.231)    (1.293) 4.260  
XSUB -0.062  0.183 ** 0.265 ** 0.040 0.263 *** 0.372 *** 
 (-0.713)  (2.291)  (3.188)  (0.467) 3.371  (4.768)
SUBPXHOST 0.488 ***     0.439 ***   
 (5.162)      (4.895)   
STICKY 
(predicted) 
-0.097  -0.123 * -0.153 **  
  
 
 (-1.588)  (-1.822)  (-2.140)    
       
STICKY 
(HI/LO)     
-0.110 * -0.174 ** -0.164 ** 
     (-1.684) (-2.530)  (-2.255)
       
         
F  26.77 *** 21.94 *** 20.08 *** 26.52 *** 23.24 *** 21.87 *** 
R2  0.56  0.46  0.39 0.51 0.43  0.36  
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